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DOES IT MATTER WHAT RELIGION IS?
Christopher L. Eisgruber* & Lawrence G. Sagert
INTRODUCTION: THE MONTY PYTHON PROBLEM
One memorable conceit of the Monty Python comedy troupe was
the problematic weapon developed by the English military during
World War II. The weapon was a joke so funny that upon hearing it
the auditor died laughing. Unfortunately, the weapon suffered from
a fatal defect: no one could learn the joke in order to deliver it with-
out suffering the fate intended for the enemy. You can imagine how
the sketch unfolds.' A dedicated soldier walks into a shed with sheaf
of paper ... uncontrolled laughter is heard . . . then a gasp and a
crash. And so on, through many zany iterations.
On some accounts, religious liberty may be self-destructive in
much the same way as the undeliverable joke. The problem goes
roughly like this: in order to protect religious liberty we have to define
what religion is, and once we are in the business of saying that some
beliefs, commitments, and projects are entitled to special treatment as
"religious" while others are not, we are creating a sphere of orthodoxy
of exactly the sort that any plausible understanding of religious liberty
should deplore.
In earlier work, we have illustrated this problem with the story of
the two Ms. Campbells who live across the street from each other in a
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suburban community. 2 Both want to run soup kitchens for the poor,
and both suffer from a zoning regulation prohibiting that activity. 3
One Ms. Campbell understands the teaching of her faith to demand
good works of this sort, and believes herself to be under personal com-
mand from her god to run her soup kitchen.4 The other Ms. Camp-
bell, if asked, would say that religion has nothing to do with her
enterprise; she cannot stand the suffering of innocent persons, and
takes widespread, poverty-driven hunger to be something that any
responsible person would seek to ameliorate. 5 Giving the first Ms.
Campbell a privilege to disregard the ordinance on the grounds that
she is religiously motivated, while denying that privilege to the second
Ms. Campbell, seems patently unjust. Indeed, it seems to be an
affront to religious liberty itself. Hence the possibility that religious
liberty will of necessity come unstrung in the same paradoxical way as
the Monty Python joke weapon.
Can religious liberty be spared this fate of self-destruction? To
put the question more narrowly, can an attractive regime of religious
liberty be built which does not insist on decisions about whether one
or another of our Ms. Campbells is appropriately religious to be its
beneficiary? If not, then the Constitution's commitment to religious
freedom would require the government to choose among controver-
sial conceptions of religion for the very purpose of identifying which
beliefs enjoyed constitutional protection. It would matter very much,
in other words, that courts be able to say exacdy what religion is.
We have no doubt that it does matter, for many purposes and in
many ways, what religion is. It matters, for example, that there is a
domain of human activity and experience which we call religion, that
we are broadly capable of distinguishing that domain from other
realms of activity and experience, and that we can call out the cultural
and personal characteristics that are common to much activity and
experience that we recognize as religious. The distinction between
religion and nonreligion is a significant ethical guidepost in many
people's lives. Sociological studies of civil society almost certainly
need to take account of religion and its impact. And it is hard to
imagine how historical, philosophical, or legal conversations about
religious freedom could proceed without a common, general under-
2 See CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND
THE CONSTITUTION 11-13, 54-55 (2007).
3 Id. at 11.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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standing of what religion is and what role it has played and continues
to play in a given time and place.
But for these purposes-however profound and important they
may be-close and controversial definitions of what counts as religion
at the margins are not likely to be crucial. More importantly, it does
not follow from these familiar contexts in which we find ourselves dis-
tinguishing religion from other activities that a robust and attractive
regime of religious liberty has to make close and controversial judg-
ments that qualify some activities as religious and disqualify others. It
does not follow-to take our ruling example-that American judges
have to decide whether the second Ms. Campbell is religiously moti-
vated or not. Indeed, we will argue that that question is entirely irrele-
vant to the administration of a well-formed regime of religious liberty.
More generally, we will argue that just where competing theories
about the definition of religion become controversial and interesting,
they also become irrelevant to constitutional law. Insofar as defini-
tions of religion are needed at all, conventional, common sense defi-
nitions will suffice.
Our starting point for these reflections is the judiciary's hands-off
approach to questions of religious doctrine, which was the focus of
the American Association of Law Schools' Law and Religion section
panel in January, 2008. Long-standing Supreme Court precedent
declares that courts ought neither to resolve "controversies over relig-
ious doctrine and practice" nor decide the "interpretation of particu-
lar church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the
religion."6 The idea that courts should keep their hands off questions
of religious doctrine rarely excites much controversy among lawyers
or constitutional scholars. And why should it? The entire project of
disestablishment might, after all, be characterized as a kind of hands-
off approach to religious doctrine.
Some commentators, however, think that while the hands-off
approach may be well motivated, it simply is not possible for courts to
stay above the fray of conflicting religious understandings. Their
doubts divide into two categories. One category pertains directly to
the hands-off approach. This category consists of mild, pragmatic con-
cerns focused on a discrete line of cases involving contracts, bequests,
or other private law instruments that refer to religion. For example,
Kent Greenawalt has discussed cases in which a church has accepted a
6 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449, 450 (1969); see also Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involve-
ment in Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REv'. 1843 (1998) (exploring
courts' limitations in resolving conflicts over religious property).
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gift subject to restrictions that refer to some aspect of religious doc-
trine.7 If a dispute later arises about whether the church has honored
the restriction, a court may have to address some questions of relig-
ious doctrine; if it declines to do so, it will effectively limit the freedom
of donors to make, and churches to accept, legally binding restrictions
on gifts.
We will comment briefly on this first category of concerns. But,
interesting as these questions may be, they fine-tune rather than
threaten to upend the enterprise of securing religious liberty. Our
focus will be on the second category of concerns, which, by our lights,
is very threatening indeed. This category consists of arguments sug-
gesting that any viable theory of religious freedom must endorse one
or another controversial definition of religion.8 The idea is, roughly
speaking, that religious freedom is about protecting religion, and that
courts will not be able to recognize the activity that they are trying to
protect if they cannot define it precisely. How, for example, can you
know whether the second Ms. Campbell is protected by the Religion
Clauses of the Constitution 9 without knowing whether her commit-
ment to alleviate the suffering of the hungry poor qualifies as
religious?1 0
This argument can then lead in either of two directions. It can
give in to the complaint that there is an embarrassing hole in the
center of the Court's religious liberty jurisprudence, and that contro-
7 See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1890-94 (illustrating the problems in deci-
phering intent to donate an inter vivos gift to a religious institution that fundamen-
tally changed its character after the donation).
8 For a sampling of recent additions to the vast literature making this argument,
see, for example, Barbra Bennett, Twentieth Century Approaches to Defining Religion: Clif-
ford Geertz and the First Amendment, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASs 93,
131 (2007) (describing courts' struggle to find criteria on which to base a definition
of religion); L. Scott Smith, Constitutional Meanings of 'Religion' Past and Present: Explo-
rations in Definition and Theory, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 89, 135-37 (2004)
(arguing that a single definition of religion does not meet the needs of a pluralistic
society such as the United States); Jeffrey Omar Usman, Defining Religion: The Struggle
to Define Religion Under the First Amendment and the Contributions and Insights of Other
Disciplines of Study Including Theology, Psychology, Sociology, the Arts, and Anthropology, 83
N.D. L. REv. 123, 188-93 (2007) (exploring the diversity in other disciplines' defini-
tions of religion and their applicability to a legal definition);Jeffrey L. Oldham, Note,
Constitutional "Religion": A Survey of First Amendment Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON
C.L. & C.R. 117, 167-71 (2001) (arguing for a narrow faith-based definition of relig-
ion which would include a belief in a supernatural element related to explanations of
good and evil).
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . .
10 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 54-55.
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versial as any such effort will be, it behooves the Court to decide what
counts as "religion" within the meaning of the Constitution's Religion
Clauses. Or this argument can cut deeper still, and lead to the conclu-
sion that religious liberty is indeed self-defeating in the same way as
the Monty Python killer joke: you cannot protect religion without
knowing what it is, but once you say what religion is, you have undone
religious liberty. 1
In our view, the idea that you must be able to define religion in
order to defend religious liberty rests on a mistaken understanding of
religious freedom, and more narrowly, of the normative thrust of the
Religion Clauses of the Constitution. We have argued elsewhere that
their purpose is not to protect religion per se, but to protect Ameri-
cans from a certain kind of governmental malfeasance that proceeds
against the backdrop of a religious and religiously diverse society.12 In
a religiously diverse society, government can find itself captive of a
perspective that encourages it-out of hostility, indifference, or mis-
understanding-to take action that unjustly prefers or disfavors some
persons, viewpoints, identities, or practices. What is critical from the
vantage of religious freedom is not that religion or religiosity be the
victim of this injustice, but rather that it is the cultural and political
ramifications of religious diversity and governmental capture that give
rise to the injustice.' 3 This may at first blush seem like a technical
refinement, but, as we will show in the pages that follow, it makes
theoretical debates about the meaning of "religion" irrelevant to the
interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the Constitution.
If a municipal zoning ordinance, for example, permitted one of
our two Ms. Campbells to run her soup kitchen, and prohibited the
other from doing so, on the basis of the difference between the belief
structures that moved each of them, that ordinance would be a deep
affront to religious liberty. And that would be so whichever Ms. Camp-
bell was favored, and whether or not we were inclined to think of the
second Ms. Campbell as religiously motivated.
11 Two important exemplars of this critique are STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED
FAILURE 45-61 (1995) and Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds
Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2255, 2264-65 (1997). Smith and Fish
claim that theories of religious freedom inevitably suffer from contradiction; hence
the quest for such a theory is a "foreordained failure" or an "impossible mission." See
SMITH, supra, at 99-117; Fish, supra, at 2324-32. For our responses to these argu-
ments, see Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Unthinking Religious Free-
dom, 74 TEX. L. REx,. 577, 590-614 (1996) (book review) and Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Book Review, 16J.L. & RELIGION 259 (2001).
12 See EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 51-73.
13 See id. at 89.
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We will elaborate this crucial point in the concluding sections of
this essay. But before we do that, we will attend more closely to the
hands-off doctrine itself. We will begin by considering the core values
of religious freedom that the doctrine reflects, and we will then look
at the largely successful efforts of the courts to implement the hands-
off approach in free exercise and other cases.
I. THE INEVITABILITY OF THE HANDS-OFF APPROACH
The Supreme Court has consistently taken the position that
American courts have no business adjudicating disputes about the
content of religious doctrine. 14 This principle has generated very lit-
tle controversy amongst either the Justices or academic commenta-
tors, and it is easy to see why. The hands-off approach to religious
doctrine, as Kent Greenawalt has called it,' 5 connects directly to the
basic idea of disestablishment. By its very definition, disestablishment
requires the government to abstain from promulgating official ver-
sions of religious doctrine. 16 If courts were to resolve controversies
about religious doctrine, they would be doing exactly what disestab-
lishment proscribes-identifying one or another version of religious
truth as the government's preferred or official view.
Indeed, the hands-off doctrine follows rather quickly from a
robust commitment to justice in a religiously plural society, whether
or not supplemented by an express disestablishment norm like the
one in the United States Constitution. 17 If government were to
endorse some interpretations of religious doctrine at the expense of
others, it would thereby favor some religious persons, sects, and
groups over others. For this reason, a constitutional regime that
respects religious diversity will inevitably generate some disestablish-
mentarian principles even if its constitution has no disestablishment
clause. The Canadian Constitution is a good example. It contains no
analogue to the First Amendment's Establishment Clause. The Cana-
dian Supreme Court has nevertheless interpreted its constitution to
14 See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25
(1976) (holding that civil courts have no authority to review church judgments about
religious doctrine).
15 See Greenawalt, supra note 6.
16 For a broad review of the disestablishment principle, see Steven D. Smith, Sepa-
ration and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955
(1989).
17 See Christopher L. Eisgruber & Mariah Zeisberg, Religious Freedom in Canada
and the United States, 4 INT'LJ. CONST. L. 244, 262-67 (2006) (describing the Supreme
Court of Canada's adoption of a disestablishment norm).
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prohibit the government from adopting policies that support or
endorse particular religious positions.18
In the United States, religious freedom scholars who disagree vig-
orously about many other questions-such as whether the govern-
ment may display religious symbols, or whether tax dollars may ever
flow to churches-nevertheless agree that the government has no bus-
iness picking and choosing among religious doctrines. For example,
although Engel v. Vitale,19 in which the Supreme Court prohibited the
government from sponsoring an official prayer, remains controversial
among the general public, it enjoys widespread (if not universal) sup-
port from leading law professors who study religious liberty.20 That is
so even though these professors represent a broad spectrum of relig-
ious and political views. Despite their differences, American commen-
tators upon religious freedom tend to be sensitive to the basic fact of
religious diversity in the United States and sympathetic to the position
of religious minorities. America's religious heterogeneity means that
any religious group will be a minority in parts of the country. If the
government were writing prayers for schoolchildren, each group
could expect to be unhappy with the prayers in some districts.
II. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL APPROACH TO IDENTIFYING BELIEF
Must there be exceptions to the hands-off doctrine? That is to
say, can courts give full effect to the Constitution's Religion Clauses
without resolving issues about religious doctrine? Or will respect for
religious freedom itself sometimes require them to wade into such
controversies, however much they might prefer to avoid them? Sup-
pose, for example, that a plaintiff comes to court and complains that
the government is burdening the exercise of her religion. The gov-
ernment defends by arguing, among other things, that its regulation
imposes no burden on the plaintiffs religion. To adjudicate this dis-
pute, does not the court need to decide whether a burden exists-and
to do that, won't the court have to decide what the plaintiff's religion
does and does not require?
Yes-but the court can and should treat the question as involving
a phenomenological claim about what the claimant in fact believes,
not a theological claim about how best to interpret religious doctrine.
18 See id.
19 370 U.S. 421, 435-37 (1962).
20 This consensus also embraces many national religious organizations. See, e.g.,
Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing Something?, 70
FORDHAM L. REv. 1147, 1153-55 (2002) (describing a "new consensus" among schol-
ars and jurists).
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The Supreme Court did exactly that to uphold the free exercise
claims of Eddie Thomas21 and George Frazee 22 during the 1980s.
Eddie Thomas was a Jehovah's Witness who, with the help of a fellow
church member, took ajob in a factory that made weapons.2 3 He was
originally employed, along with his friend, in the plant's foundry, but,
when the foundry closed, he and his friend were reassigned to make
tank turrets. 24 His friend accepted the assignment and believed it to
be consistent with his faith. Thomas did not.25 He maintained that
his religion permitted him to work in the foundry, where he was
involved in producing material used to make weapons, but it prohib-
ited him from working more directly on the fabrication of weapons. 26
He quit his job and sought unemployment benefits. The State of Indi-
ana refused to provide them, concluding that Thomas had declined
available work without good cause.27 Thomas claimed that Indiana
had unconstitutionally burdened his free exercise rights by refusing to
recognize his religious reasons as "good cause" for declining work;
Indiana responded by claiming that Jehovah's Witnesses were not in
fact barred by their faith from assisting in the manufacture of tank
turrets. 28
Indiana's rationale invited the Supreme Court to resolve a doctri-
nal controversy: did the religious doctrines of Jehovah's Witnesses
really prohibit Thomas from working on tank turrets? One can
understand Indiana's skepticism about Thomas' claims. After all,
Thomas himself had been willing to work in the munitions factory so
long as his contributions to the weapons projects were indirect.29
Moreover, his friend and fellow believer apparently had no problem
accepting the new assignment.
The Supreme Court, however, wisely abstained from passing judg-
ment on Thomas' beliefs. The only relevant question, said the Court,
was whether Thomas sincerely believed that his faith barred him from
working on the turrets. 30 "The determination of what is a religious
belief or practice .... is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the
particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be
21 Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
22 Frazee v. Ill. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
23 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 710.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 710-11.
27 Id. at 710-13.
28 Id. at 710-12.
29 Id. at 711.
30 Id. at 714.
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acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order
to merit First Amendment protection," said the Court.3 1 It added,
[I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to
inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly
perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not
arbiters of scriptural interpretation.
The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is to
determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner
terminated his work because of an honest conviction that such work
was forbidden by his religion. 32
Eight years later, George Frazee arrived at the Court with a simi-
lar claim. 33 Like Thomas, Frazee had quit his job because of a relig-
ious belief. Frazee's employer had required him to work on Sundays,
and Frazee said that his faith obliged him to treat Sunday as a day of
rest. 34 The Illinois unemployment benefits commission was not per-
suaded: it pointed out that Frazee claimed to be a Christian, but not
to be a member of any organized Christian sect.35 As Illinois correctly
noted, many Christians were willing to work on Sundays. 36
The Supreme Court sided with Frazee. "[M]embership in an
organized religious denomination" might make it easier for courts to
determine whether a claimant held a particular belief, but such mem-
bership was not a prerequisite to a successful free exercise claim.3 7
The relevant question was whether Frazee's religious belief was sin-
cerely held, not whether it was well justified or shared with anyone
else. 38
The Supreme Court held, in effect, that Thomas and Frazee were
the ultimate authorities on-sovereign over-their own religious
beliefs. The Court thus sidestepped the resolution of a question of
religious doctrine in favor of a factual question of individual phenom-
enology: the critical issue was the nature and internal force of what
Thomas or Frazee believed, not whether their beliefs were justifiable
inferences from, or interpretations of, whatever sources they recog-
nized as sacred.3 9
31 Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
32 Id. at 716.
33 Frazee v. I11. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
34 Id. at 830.
35 Id. at 831.
36 Id. at 835.
37 Id. at 834.
38 Id.
39 Id.; Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).
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Courts are thus able to identify and respond to religious belief
while absolving themselves of any judgments about religious doc-
trine.40 But Kent Greenawalt has suggested that considerations of
religious freedom might themselves give courts a reason to go further,
and in so doing to modify or soften the contours of the hands-off doc-
trine.41 Greenawalt draws our attention to cases in which a religious
organization splits, so that two or more factions make competing
claims for church property. In some of these cases, Greenawalt main-
tains, courts may limit religious freedom if they inflexibly refuse to
choose among contending interpretations of religious doctrine. 42
For example, suppose that a testator gives money to an Orthodox
Jewish congregation established, by the terms of its charter, for "the
worship of God according to the Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual." 43 In
Poland, and at the congregation when the bequest is made, men and
women were segregated during services. Some years later, the leaders
of the congregation ask it to vote on whether to allow mixed-sex seat-
ing. The motion carries, but a minority secedes on the ground that
this decision is inconsistent with "Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual."
The two sides get into a legal dispute about the bequest. Who wins?
And would the result be different if the bequest, like the charter,
explicitly referred to "Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual"?44
In such cases, courts face a choice between deferring to the
apparent leadership of the preexisting congregation (though in some
cases even the identity of the leadership may be contested) 45 or deter-
mining what counts as an "Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual." Greena-
walt contends that neither option is fully satisfactory.46 A blunt rule
requiring complete deference to organizational leadership may pro-
duce outcomes quite inconsistent with the intentions of a particular
40 One of the few critics of the Court's approach is Samuel J. Levine. See, e.g.,
SamuelJ. Levine, Rethinking the Court's Hands-Off Approach to Questions of Religious Prac-
tice and Belief, 25 FoRDHAm Ua. L.J. 85, 85-87 (1997). Levine suggests that by
extending equal constitutional protection to idiosyncratic beliefs, the Court may have
made it less attractive for judges to protect conventionally recognized beliefs. Id. at
87.
41 Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1865 (summarizing relevant constitutional and
judicial values and arguing that "[a]ccomplishing some as fully as possible means sac-
rificing others").
42 See id. at 1906.
43 Katz v. Singerman, 127 So. 2d 515, 518 (La. 1961). Greenawalt's discussion of
this case appears in Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1890-92.
44 See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1890-94.
45 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 441-43 (1969).
46 See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 1890-94.
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donor; conversely, ajudicial inquiry into the meaning of terms such as
"Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual" may involve courts in controversies
they are ill-situated to resolve (and, for that reason, may produce
results equally inconsistent with the donors' intentions).47
Should these cases disrupt our commitment to the hands-off doc-
trine? We can gain some insight into the problem by setting our
"Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual" case against the more general and
more common (albeit quite difficult) run of cases about incompletely
specified contracts, such as the famous case about the sale of "Rose 2d
of Aberlone. ''48 Rose was a cow offered for purchase; the buyer and
seller both believed she was infertile, but she turned out to be preg-
nant (and hence much more valuable than they knew) .49
In such a case, courts can respond in one of two broad ways. A
court could adopt what we can call a policy-based response to the
incomplete contract before it; policy-based in the sense that no effort
will be made to discover or construct the will of the parties with regard
to the unexpressed terms of the contract. Policy-based approaches to
incomplete contracts involve default rules that do not depend upon
any judgment particularized to the parties at hand or contract at
hand. In a jurisdiction where transactions about cattle are common,
for example, a default rule could be "in any contract for the sale of a
cow, a failure to specify the fertility of the cow will be interpreted by
the court as reflecting the understanding of the parties to the contract
that the cow in question is fertile." Or the reverse rule might be
adopted. We are out of our depth here. But the point is that in any of
the possible policy-based approaches: (1) sophisticated parties can
anticipate the consequence of incompleteness in their contract; and
(2) courts are not called upon to use their judgment to fill in the
terms of the contract in the name of the parties before it or otherwise.
Or, in an incomplete contract case like Rose of Aberlone's, a
court could adopt an intention-based approach. In form, an intention-
based approach is likely to ask this question: what would the buyer
and seller have done if, contrary to fact, they had anticipated and pro-
vided for the contingency that Rose was fertile? Of course,
counterfactual questions of this sort are notoriously hard to answer.
Whether it admits what it is doing or not, a court is likely to find itself
answering a different question, a question that is immediately adja-
47 Id. at 1905 ("[B]ecause of various competing values, no resolution of the role
of civil courts is fully satisfactory. Perhaps the most fundamental dilemma is that
courts cannot both avoid resolving religious questions and give effect to all the expec-
tations of those deeply involved in religious organizations.")
48 Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 920 (Mich. 1887).
49 Id.
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cent to this difficult counterfactual one, namely: what should the buyer
and seller have done if... ? Answering that question may very well be
the best available way of answering the counterfactual question; and
on some accounts of courts and contracts, this might in fact be the
better question for the court to seek to answer.
There is an ongoing debate about whether courts should be
intention-based or policy-based in the face of incomplete contracts,
and what more precise form their intention-based or policy-based role
should take. 50 The perceived stakes include predictability, overall effi-
ciency, and fairness between contracting parties. But there are impor-
tant limits on what plausible arguments can be made on behalf of
either approach. No one could plausibly argue, for example, that a
contracting party in a jurisdiction that followed a strong policy-based
approach to incomplete contracts was being denied his or her day in
court or due process when a court in that jurisdiction refused to
launch a particularized, counterfactual inquiry in service of reshaping
the contract. After all, parties in such jurisdictions have the option of
specifying the outcomes of future contingencies, including a mistaken
judgment of bovine fecundity. Similarly, no one could plausibly argue
that some deep form of injustice was at risk when a court in an inten-
tion-based jurisdiction undertook to supply an incomplete contract
with terms reasonably attributable to the parties' inchoate intentions,
or alternatively, terms that were simply reasonable.
With this in mind, let us return to our "Orthodox Polish Jewish
Ritual" testamentary donor. 51 His case is very much like Rose of
Aberlone's, in that it is the absence of any contractual provision deal-
ing with schism within the beneficiary congregation that causes
problems.52 And as in the Rose of Aberlone case, a court confronting
the problem of the donor could pursue an intention-based or a policy-
based approach. Here, the policy-based approach is likely to entail
some form of judicial support for existing church authority and
existing distributions of property rights, on the grounds that this sta-
tus quo-favoring position makes it possible to avoid judgments of relig-
50 For default rule theories, see Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incom-
plete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989) and CharlesJ.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REv. 261 (1985).
51 See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
52 Contract law typically distinguishes between mistakes about present facts (such
as whether Rose was fertile at the time she was sold) and the failure to anticipate
future events that arguably frustrate completion of the contract (such as occurred
when the Jewish congregation fractured). See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
For our purposes, at least, this distinction is immaterial.
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ious substance. This, of course, is entirely consistent with the hands-
off approach and the values upon which it rests.
The more interesting issue is whether a court in the case of the
"Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual" donor could or should adopt an
intention-based approach. The intention-based approach would
encourage the court to inquire as to what the donor would have done
if, contrary to fact, he had provided for the possibility that the congre-
gation would fracture over a controversial change to its rituals.
Now it is just at this point that things get rather messy. We have
seen that in the free exercise context, courts avoid taking positions
about religious doctrine by particularizing their inquiry to the phe-
nomenology of the individual free exercise claimant.53 Can they do
that here? There is, of course, no fact of the matter behind the
counterfactual inquiry as to what the "Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual"
testator would have done if he had thought to provide for the possibil-
ity that the congregation that he wished to benefit might abolish its
practice of segregated worship. All that is available is a conjecture.
In a few situations, this conjecture might have some meaningful
psychological (as opposed to theological) content. For example, if
there is convincing evidence that the testator had regarded the segre-
gation of men and women in Orthodox Polish Jewish worship as enor-
mously important, and was attracted to the congregation in question
precisely because it maintained that segregation, these facts would
offer a judge or jury reason for thinking that if the testator had
thought to draft a provision regarding mixed-sex seating, the provi-
sion would have been to the disadvantage of the renegade
congregation.
Were a court to adopt the intention-based approach under these
circumstances, and build a term into the testator's will that favored
the minority, gender-segregated-worship-supporting portion of the
congregation, the exercise of state authority implicated by the court's
action would have important elements in common with the phenome-
nological approach in free exercise cases. Here, as in the free exer-
cise cases, the court would be determining and acting on the
sovereign judgment of an individual, not passing judgment in any way
on a controversial matter of religious doctrine or practice. But most
cases will be far less clear, and the absence of clarity will invite the
judiciary to cross the line into the domain of deciding questions of
religious substance.
Suppose, for example, that the evidence is that the testator loved
his congregation because it was traditional and committed to old val-
53 See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
20091
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ues and old ways. Or suppose that the testator came from generations
of Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual faithful, who loved and supported
the deep values of their faith for decades upon decades of temptation
to choose other, more modern, variations on the Jewish faith. These
may seem like modest variations on the more specific evidence of his
commitment to gender worship segregation, but note what sort of
inquiry might now be demanded. Suppose that the progressive mem-
bers of the congregation insist that, properly understood, their will-
ingness to abolish gender-segregated worship better connects with the
old values and old traditions of their faith. The court would then have
to ask troubling questions, such as, "What are the deep values of the
Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual, and are they advanced or retarded by
insisting on the maintenance of gender segregation?" Even these
modest inquiries verge on asking what a good congregant of the
Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual variety should want for his congrega-
tion, and so put judges in the constitutionally disturbing position of
taking sides in a religious conflict.
To be sure, the court could conduct its inquiries at a sort of arm's
length. In other words, it could ask not about what beliefs are best,
but rather which ones appear to be best from the vantage of a stipu-
lated set of prior assumptions, commitments, and/or values. So a
judge could sensibly say to herself, in effect, "Personally, I recoil at the
thought of gender-segregated worship, and nothing that I believe or
value would support this wretched practice, but I think that that is
precisely what someone steeped in the traditions of the 'Orthodox
Polish Jewish Ritual' would have wanted for his congregation." But if,
at the end of the day, this is tantamount to saying, what someone
steeped in the traditions of the Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual should
have wanted, then the state has put itself in the business of choosing
sides in the domain of a contested orthodoxy.
The Anglican Church, for example, is on the brink of a world-
wide schism, and local manifestations of the deep division within the
church have begun to serve up church-property disputes. 54 In a sense,
a court which put the hands-off doctrine aside and purported to
resolve such a dispute on grounds of which of the contending factions
represented the church's deepest beliefs, commitments, and/or val-
ues could be doing so at arm's length; this would be a claim about the
history and theology of a particular sectarian tradition, not a claim
54 See, e.g., In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Prop. Lit., CL 2007-0248724 (Va.
Cir. Ct. June 27, 2008), available at http://www.thediocese.net/News services/Prop-
erty/5_questions.pdf (deciding five questions about controlling case law regarding
church property).
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about religious truth. But it is hard to imagine a more vivid instance
of the state taking sides in a theological dispute to the detriment of
religious liberty in a pluralist society.
We can now say something about the comparison between the
ordinary run of incomplete contract issues, represented by Rose of
Aberlone, and the special case of church property disputes, repre-
sented by the "Orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual" testator. In ordinary
contracts cases, we have seen that while there is ongoing debate in
legal theory circles about policy-based versus intention-based
approaches to incomplete contracts, the stakes on either side are
modest. 55 Contracting parties cannot insist that deep injustice is
threatened when a court makes use of policy-based default rules.
Neither can they claim that such an injustice follows from an inten-
tion-based approach where a court attempts counterfactual comple-
tion of the contract, even where, as is often likely to be the case, the
court will be making judgments as to what the parties should have
agreed to do as opposed to what they would have agreed to do. But
church property cases are different, in that an intention-based
approach by a court is likely not only to drift from the safe harbor of a
counterfactual prediction that rests squarely on an individual claim-
ant's phenomenology, but also to enter the normatively unacceptable
waters of choosing sides in theological debates.
There are two possible ways we could shape doctrine in response
to these observations. One would be to permit very limited and very
cautious counterfactual inquiry in cases like the "Orthodox Polish Jew-
ish Ritual" testator. Properly constrained, such an inquiry would not
be a repudiation of the hands-off doctrine and the values that demand
that doctrine, but rather a realization that the phenomenological
approach can be extended in a limited set of church property cases.
The other approach would be for courts in the name of the hands-off
doctrine to refuse ever to take an intention-based approach in church
property cases, given how limited appropriate cases for intention-
based intervention are and how fraught such cases are with the dan-
ger of encouraging judges to step outside the boundaries of the phe-
nomenological approach and into the realm of making official state
judgments about matters of contested theology.56
55 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
56 Greenawalt reaches a similar conclusion. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 6, at
1892 ("Courts should not assume that a grantor intended continuation of any specific
practices, unless the grant explicitly covers those practices, or the new practices,
according to an overwhelmingly dominant public understanding, make the group a
different kind of religious body." (footnote omitted)).
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Our own instinct favors the prophylactic approach. But more
important than this conclusion is the understanding that it is the
hands-off approach that ultimately should govern these cases, and that
the only reasonable choice is between alternatives that lie within that
approach.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH FOCUSING ON RELIGION
As we noted earlier, the hands-off approach itself is widely
accepted. Many scholars and judges, however, seem to believe that
while courts should abstain from choosing among contested interpre-
tations of religious doctrine, they have no choice but to choose among
contested interpretations of the concept of religion. For example, in
both Thomas and Frazee, the Supreme Court suggested that constitu-
tional rights are exquisitely sensitive to the distinction between relig-
ion and nonreligion. The Court asserted that while the beliefs and
practices protected by the Free Exercise Clause might be unorthodox,
ill-articulated, idiosyncratic, and perhaps even contradictory, they had
to be religious rather than secular. 57 "There is no doubt that '[o]nly
beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise clause,"'
declared the Frazee Court. 58 "Purely secular views do not suffice," it
continued.59
The Thomas Court supported this categorical aside by referring to
constitutional text, observing that "the Free Exercise clause,... by its
terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion."60 That can-
not possibly be the end of the matter. After all, the First Amendment
also singles out "speech" and "press" for special protections, 61 but the
Court has had no trouble generalizing those protections to encom-
pass other forms of expression such as arm bands,62 campaign contri-
butions, 63 flag-burning and flag salutes,64 none of which is literally
"speech" or "press." There is, moreover, a durable and compelling
57 See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text.
58 Frazee v. I11. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989) (quoting
Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981) (alteration in original)).
59 Id. Bizarrely, the Court cited United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), to
support this last proposition. The Seeger Court did indeed opine that only religious
convictions were entitled to protection, but it then proceeded to protect (on statutory
grounds) atheist convictions on the ground that they were functionally equivalent to
religious beliefs. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 185-88.
60 Thomas, 450 U.S. at 713.
61 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. 1.
62 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
63 See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
64 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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tradition in free speech cases to the effect that compelled speech (as in
flag salutes 65 and license plate mottos66 ) is anathema to liberty. The
Court has recognized, in other words, that the freedom not to speak is
implicit in the freedom to speak. It is at least equally plausible that
religion can be freely exercised only if one is also free to choose not to
exercise it at all. Thus some thoughtful commentators maintain that,
in a modern democracy, "religious freedom should by definition
include the freedom not to believe in a religion." 67 Whether or not
that is so, the Frazee and Thomas courts' preference for religious
beliefs and practices cannot be defended simply by pointing to the
text of the First Amendment.
That is a good thing, because the view expressed in Frazee and
Thomas would require courts to distinguish beliefs that were religious
from those that were not, and thus to define "religion" for purposes of
constitutional interpretation. This consequence should trouble us. If,
in the name of religious liberty, courts are charged with the task of
distinguishing religious commitments and practices from their non-
religious parallels, the deep, religious-liberty-centered values that
motivate the hands-off approach to religious doctrine will be fatally
compromised. In the end, religious liberty will be thoroughly
undone-it will turn out to be much like Monty Python's self-defeat-
ing, lethal joke.
To see why, consider again the case of the two Ms. Campbells
with which we began this Essay. 68 One Ms. Campbell understands her-
self to be under the command of her god to open a soup kitchen; the
other Ms. Campbell attributes her passion for the same enterprise to
the obligations of decency in the face of the suffering of her fellow
human beings. Both seek judicial relief from the strictures of a zon-
ing regulation that prohibits soup kitchens. Now, if the disposition of
their claims depends on whether one or both of them is religiously
motivated, the court will have to begin by deciding whether the benef-
icence of the second Ms. Campbell emanates from secular motives or
religious ones. Does a supreme being have to enter the story? Is a
deeply held, life-organizing set of moral beliefs a religion? Do others
have to share in her commitments? And on and on.
Even the first, plainly religious Ms. Campbell may present the
court with difficulties. Suppose it is clear that she is religious and that
65 See W. Va. State Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
66 See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
67 Garry Wills, Romney and JFK The Difference, N.Y. RivIEW OF BooKS, Jan. 17,
2008, at 32, 32 (emphasis added).
68 See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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religion requires her to care for the poor. Does it require her to oper-
ate a soup kitchen, or does she have other choices? Must the soup
kitchen be in her home, or could it be elsewhere? Suppose the first
Ms. Campbell admits that she could fulfill her religious obligation to
care for the poor in many different ways, but she thinks that, in light
of her personal resources and abilities, opening a soup kitchen at
home would be the most impactful and meaningful way of doing so.
Is her reason for choosing the soup kitchen over other options secular
or religious? If her god has spoken to her, how detailed must the
message have been?
Judicial inquiries of this kind should trouble anyone committed
to religious freedom. They are in the deepest sense morally arbitrary:
people with very similar commitments and projects would have differ-
ent rights depending on the fine points of their religious views. They
are personally intrusive: to assert their rights, people must be willing
to expose their religious beliefs to extensive and detailed cross-exami-
nation in court. They are potentially coercive: if either Ms. Campbell
knows that her ability to operate a soup kitchen depends on whether
she is able to say the right things about her passionate commitment,
then she may begin to talk and think about that commitment a bit
differently.
Strictly speaking, the judicial inquiry that we are at such pains to
renounce is not inconsistent with the hands-off approach. Under the
principles developed in Thomas and Frazee, when more or less recog-
nizably religious commitments are inconsistent with state regulatory
mandates, nobody has to say whether the implicated religious impulse
is correct, attractive, coherent, or reasonably extrapolated from
acknowledged doctrine. 69 That is the point of the phenomenological
approach, which asks only what the individual in question believes,
and with what degree of intensity the belief is held. But note: if courts
have to sort out the rights of the two Ms. Campbells on the basis of
what beliefs count as "religious," the hard questions begin after the
phenomenological inquiry is over. Although courts will not have to
resolve disputes about religious doctrine, they will have to decide
higher order and, every bit as troubling, questions about what will
count as religious at all. The state, through the articulate form ofjudi-
cial judgments and opinions, will be put in the position of choosing-
and so by implication favoring, and by further implication, valo-
rizing-some values and commitments over others. The result is a
69 See Frazee v. I11. Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 833 (1989); Thomas
v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981).
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state-sponsored orthodoxy of precisely the sort the hands-off doctrine
is meant to avoid.
For example, in the case of the first Ms. Campbell, our judge was
confronted with the question of whether Ms. Campbell's reasons for
operating a soup kitchen qualified as "religious" if she believed that
her religion gave her multiple options about how to care for the poor.
Even with the help of Ms. Campbell's personal theological bootstraps
(for example "I believe that all my impulses of this sort are guided by
and reflect the will of God"), the judge ultimately will have to deter-
mine the religious or nonreligious character of Ms. Campbell's beliefs
on the basis of some legal criterion extrinsic to those beliefs. In so
doing, the judge cannot hope to reach a conclusion that is neutral
among religions: any definition of religion will be more acceptable to
some religions than to others, and the judge's choice will almost cer-
tainly be influenced by familiarity with a particular religious tradition.
A well-disciplined judge could make scope-of-religion judgments of
this sort on nonreligious grounds; but, in the end, he or she will be in
the business of fashioning a kind of orthodoxy, however generous in
scope.
This unfortunate result is not merely a minor problem in an oth-
erwise sound enterprise. If the project of religious freedom is depen-
dent on choosing among contested conceptions of what is religious,
then that project is contradictory and self-destructive at its very core.
We really are in the grip of the Monty Python problem.
It bears emphasis that this problem is not merely an artifact of
our particular approach to religious liberty, equal liberty, which
emphasizes the equal status of believers and nonbelievers.70 It is a
problem as well under the leading competitors to equal liberty, most
of which endorse some version of what Douglas Laycock and Michael
McConnell have called "substantive neutrality. ' 71 Substantive neutral-
ity requires that the government do its best not to influence religious
choices and commitments one way or the other. Any plausible elabo-
ration of substantive neutrality will involve a heavy dose of equality
norms: insofar as the government treats some faiths better than
others, it will give people an incentive to adopt those faiths. If courts
are in the business of saying what counts as religious, some passionate
moral commitments and projects will be treated better than others,
and the resulting distinction will wreak havoc with substantive neutral-
70 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2, at 52-53.
71 See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 993, 1001-02 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Religious
Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 156 n.187, 169 (1992).
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ity. If either Ms. Campbell is more likely to win her case because she
casts her motive for running a soup kitchen in more exquisitely relig-
ious terms, the government will have given her an incentive to do
exactly that.
IV. PROHIBITING DISCRIMINATION ASSOCIATED wITH DiVERSiTY
AMONG TRADITIONAL FORMS OF RELIGION
We believe that there is a straightforward and morally attractive
understanding of the Religion Clauses that eliminates the need to
privilege a particular view of religion. This understanding begins
from the observation that, throughout modern history and today,
religious diversity has too often been the catalyst of discrimination.
Religious belief and practice are sites of human experience where
insensitivity, indifference, and hostility appear with unfortunate fre-
quency. The resulting mistreatment, in simple sketch, can occur in
two ways: a vulnerable religious group may find its needs or interests
neglected by a hostile (or simply indifferent) majority, or a powerful
religious group may disregard the needs and interests of nonmem-
bers. Discrimination of this sort is the greatest enemy of religious
freedom, and, such discrimination is, we believe, what the Constitu-
tion's Religion Clauses aim to forbid. Thus, the Constitution's job is
not to privilege or protect religion per se, but rather to protect all
citizens from discrimination born of religious diversity. If religious
liberty and the Religion Clauses of the Constitution are so under-
stood, the futile and dangerous venture of defining religion at its con-
troversial margins can be avoided altogether.
On this view of the Religion Clauses, neither of the Ms.
Campbells will find her constitutional rights dependent upon whether
her reasons for feeding the poor in her home are religious. If either
is denied the freedom to feed the poor only because her reasons for
doing so are not conventionally religious or because her reasons are
in some disfavored way religious, then she is a victim of precisely the
sort of discrimination that the Constitution's Religion Clauses pro-
scribe. What matters is not the religious or nonreligious character of
either Ms. Campbell's reasons for action, but rather the discrimina-
tory, disparaging, or exclusive character of the government's reasons
for action. Thus any rule or judgment that distinguished between the
rights of the two Ms. Campbells on the grounds that one's motivations
were suitably religious and the other's were not would almost surely
be unconstitutional. For that reason, it doesn't matter whether we
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think of the second Ms. Campbell as religious, and it doesn't matter
which Ms. Campbell is the victim of the discriminatory treatment.72
This understanding of religious liberty and the Religion Clauses
dissolves what would otherwise be impossible conundrums surround-
ing the concept of religion and the problem of orthodoxy. For exam-
ple, under this approach, we need not decide whether atheism is itself
a religion, or whether atheistic or agnostic convictions might ever
count as religious. Consider in this regard the question of whether
atheists or agnostics are constitutionally entitled to claim conscien-
tious objector status if recognizably religious pacifists are allowed to
do so. That issue arose, of course, in United States v. Seeger.73 At the
time, federal law authorized conscientious objector status only for
those who could demonstrate themselves committed to pacifism by
virtue of their "religious training and belief. ' 74 The statute defined
"religious training and belief' to mean "'an individual's belief in a
relation to a Supreme Being'- 75 but not to extend to "essentially polit-
ical, sociological, or philosophical views."' 76 Daniel Seeger claimed to
be both a pacifist and an atheist. 77 The Supreme Court held that,
under the terms of the statute, Seeger's views were religious, because
72 Professor Greenawalt overlooks this central point when he suggests that our
equality-driven view of religious liberty must eventually do something analogous to
defining religion, albeit using a different vocabulary. See Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off:
When and About What, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 917 (2009) (arguing that our
position requires drawing a "line . . . cast in terms other than religion"). As the text
accompanying this note makes clear, our theory does not depend in any way upon
whether either Ms. Campbell's belief can be characterized in any sense as religious or
quasi-religious. No lines of the sort that Professor Greenawalt has in mind need to be
drawn.
Professor Greenawalt is also mistaken to suppose that we must define religion in
order to apply the Establishment Clause. Id. at 915-16. In our view, the central
Establishment Clause vice is that of governmental acts which carry a social meaning
that denigrates believers outside the religious mainstream. Here too, only a conven-
tional, commonsense understanding of religion is needed to render constitutional
justice. See infra Part V.
Under our theory, of course, difficult cases will arise, cases in which it will be
difficult to say with confidence whether the governmental action in question is incon-
sistent with norms of fairness among a religiously diverse people. But all theories
confront hard cases. The problem with the project of defining religion for the pur-
poses of a regime of religious liberty is not that it will encounter hard cases; the prob-
lem is that the project is incoherent and self-contradictory at its core.
73 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
74 Id. at 165.
75 Id. (quoting the Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 456(j) (1958)).
76 Id.
77 Id. at 166.
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they held a place in his life "parallel to that filled by the God of those
admittedly qualifying for the exemption." 78 Under the view we are
proposing, the Religion Clauses protected Seeger without regard to
whether his views counted as "religious." Congress treated atheistic
ethical views less respectfully than others precisely because those views
were not conventionally religious, and that fact is sufficient to show
that Seeger was the victim of the sort of mistreatment that the Relig-
ion Clauses prohibit. The Court's remarkably strained reading of the
statute in the Seeger case suggests that the Justices were in the grip of
precisely this constitutional intuition and so struggled mightily to
bring Seeger within the statute's beneficial ambit. 79
We have, of course, been throwing around the terms "religion"
and "religious" throughout the last few paragraphs, and some people
may accordingly suspect that we are guilty of circular reasoning: we say
that we can avoid having to define "religion," but then we help our-
selves to that very term, as though it had already been defined. We do
not deny, though, that in order to understand what religious freedom
is, one must have some general understanding of what groups and
activities in our society count as religious. What we deny is that one
needs to know exactly which groups or beliefs fit that definition; it is
good enough to recognize the conventional and familiar exemplars,
and to know something about the general culture of religious diversity
and the conflicts that culture has experienced or generated.
Prominent, conventionally recognized religions (such as the vari-
ous Protestant sects, Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam) share a number
of characteristics that create an environment ripe with the potential
for discrimination, hostility, or mistreatment. So, for example, the
doctrines of these religions often link true belief and virtue, so that
nonbelievers are judged to be tainted by the very fact of their nonbe-
lief. Conventionally recognized religions insist on public rituals
(forms of prayer, ways of dress, dietary practices, and so on) that mark
members publicly and may provoke puzzlement, distaste, contempt,
or worse from outsiders. Membership in these religious groups has
traditionally been an all-or-nothing matter (either you are in or you
are out), and it is a high-stakes affair: not only worldly reputation but
78 Id. at 176.
79 Justice Harlan, who had joined the Court's opinion in Seeger, later admitted
that he had done so reluctantly. He argued that Seeger's ultimate conclusion was cor-
rect, but only because the congressional statute would have been unconstitutional if
its protections were limited to religious beliefs. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333, 344-45 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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eternal salvation may be at stake.8 0 When membership in a group is a
matter of great import, is publicly visible, and is associated with prac-
tices that seem indispensible to members but strange or even threat-
ening to nonmembers, the potential for conflict and discrimination is
great. History provides ample evidence of this fact: the religions
familiar to the Framers and to us have a long history of interfaith and
interdenominational rivalry and competition.
Our point is not to criticize or condemn religion. Along with
conflict has come much that is good, including, in the right circum-
stances, a capacity for interfaith cooperation. Our purpose is instead
to note that traditional religious groups have been associated with cer-
tain kinds of mistreatment. Significantly, neither the perpetrators nor
the victims of this mistreatment need themselves be members of a
traditional religious group. Constitutional norms aimed at preventing
such mistreatment, while inspired by the behavior and needs of tradi-
tional religious groups, must offer protection that extends beyond the
boundaries of those groups and, indeed, beyond the edges of most
understandings of religion. On this understanding, the Religion
Clauses have as their target not religion, but rather justice in a society
that both celebrates religious diversity and understands its perils.,,
That observation saves us from the rather hopeless task of defin-
ing what counts as religion for constitutional purposes. If the point of
the Constitution's Religion Clauses was to protect, promote, privilege,
benefit, or demarcate religious behavior in distinction to other kinds
of behavior, we could not avoid that question. It would then matter
hugely whether the second Ms. Campbell's project, or Daniel Seeger's
deeply held beliefs, were religious. If they qualified as religious,
Campbell and Seeger would be protected; if not, they would be out of
luck. Under such a view, esoteric arguments about the distinction
80 For an overview of world religions, see STEPHEN SHAROT, A COMPARATIVE Soci-
OLOGY OF WORLD RELIGIONS 3-20 (2001).
81 In our earlier writing, we have characterized this injustice as government
behavior that fails to fully credit or fairly treat some groups or individuals on account
of the "spiritual foundations" of their interests and commitments. See, e.g., EISGRUBER
& SAGER, supra note 2, at 52 ("First, [our model] insists in the name of equality that
no members of our political community ought to be devalued on account of the spiri-
tual foundations of their important commitments and projects."). That formulation
could lead readers of our work to think that we have simply substituted "spiritual
foundations" for "religion," and that we seek to valorize and protect religion in this
renamed guise; it could also lead readers to think that far from ducking the difficulty
of defining religion, we've simply renamed our problem. But what we have meant to
capture by our usage is what we say more explicitly here: we are concerned not with a
constitutionally valorized activity, but with a constitutionally anticipated peril, the
peril of discrimination provoked by religious diversity and its attendant culture.
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between religion and nonreligion would have great constitutional sig-
nificance. But that is not so if the Religion Clauses prevent the forms
of mistreatment historically associated with religious conflict. Those
mistreatments include injuries inflicted on the ground that the
targeted activity is viewed as not religious, or not religious in the right
way, by some powerful (religious) group. Or, to put the matter differ-
ently, religious liberty (unlike Monty Python's lethal joke) is not self-
destructive, and we do not have to decide whether Ms. Campbell's and
Daniel Seeger's reasons for action are religious in character. We do
indeed have to know something about the meaning of religion, but we
need recognize only the core or paradigm cases. As we said earlier,
where disputes about the definition of religion become interesting,
they also become irrelevant for constitutional purposes.
V. INTERPRETING THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
By interpreting the Free Exercise Clause as aimed at prohibiting a
certain kind of vice historically related to religious persecution, rather
than as aimed at protecting religion per se, we can minimize the need
for courts to distinguish between religious and nonreligious values
and practices. We can thereby avoid the need for the disturbing and
self-destructive judicial inquiries that we imagined in the case of the
two Ms. Campbells.
Are matters different on the Establishment Clause side? It might
at first seem so. Public schools, for example, have considerably more
constitutional discretion about whether to sponsor flag salutes than to
sponsor prayers, and more discretion to teach philosophy than to
teach theology. It might seem impossible to explain these differences
without appealing to some definition of religion. We believe, though,
that the Establishment Clause is in this respect no different from the
Free Exercise Clause: its point is to prevent forms of discrimination
and mistreatment associated with the conflict among conventionally
recognized religions, and to apply the Clause we need only to recog-
nize the features associated with those religions, not to endorse one or
another controversial theory about what religion is.
The Establishment Clause targets a certain kind of government-
sponsored favoritism, and the critical question in an Establishment
Clause case is whether such favoritism is present. For example, it
seems obvious that public schools cannot preach the virtues of athe-
ism any more than they can preach the virtues of Christianity, and it
seems equally obvious that the truth of that rule should not depend
on whether we define atheism to be a religion. Conversely, schools
can teach the Bible as literature and as one possible but potentially
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fallible source of moral wisdom, just as they can teach Hegel (for
example) in that way but cannot require students to affirm that
Hegel's views are true.
We do not mean to suggest that religious practices and nonrelig-
ious practices should get treated exactly the same way under the
Establishment Clause. On the contrary, as we have already noted, the
government has much more discretion when teaching about political
or philosophical matters than when teaching about religion. These
differences, though, stem not from whatever characteristics distin-
guish (according to some controversial theory) religious from nonreli-
gious activity, but rather from features of familiar religious practices
that have made them sites of discrimination and conflict. For exam-
ple, public prayer rituals serve as (among other things) markers of
group membership that identify some persons as "insiders" and others
as "outsiders." There is no equivalent practice in the study of Hege-
lian philosophy, nor have disputes about Hegelian philosophy been a
traditional source of social divisions in the United States, which is why
it makes sense for the Constitution to treat Hegel studies and Bible
studies quite differently.
We have elsewhere elaborated our view of the Establishment
Clause by focusing attention on the social meaning of government
sponsorship of religious rituals or symbols, and we hope that readers
interested in a full-blown account of our view will consult that work. 2
Our point here does not, however, depend on the details of our Estab-
lishment Clause theory. For present purposes, we need only argue
that it makes sense to view the Establishment Clause, like the Free
Exercise Clause, as targeting a form of government favoritism or dis-
crimination related to historically familiar religious practices and con-
flicts; that recognizing this form of government misconduct does not
require us to choose among controversial theories about what counts
as religion; and that while hard cases will certainly arise under this
view of the Establishment Clause, those cases will not turn upon unan-
swerable questions about what sorts of practices and beliefs deserve to
be regarded as religious. For example, when courts are called upon to
decide whether public schools may offer classes in transcendental
meditation, 3 the wrong question to ask is whether transcendental
meditation is a religion (or a religious practice). The right question
to ask is whether government sponsorship of classes in transcendental
82 Id. at 124-28.
83 See, e.g., Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 198, 213-14 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that
the Science of Creative Intelligence/Transcendental Meditation is a constitutionally
protected religion).
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meditation involves the same kind of failure of equal regard that
makes it unconstitutional for the government to sponsor prayer
ceremonies.8 4
VI. REVISITING THE TEXTUAL ARGUMENT
Our view of the Religion Clauses alleviates the need to define the
edges of the concept of religion. It accomplishes that task by shifting
the focus of constitutional analysis from the activity of religion to a
form of government misconduct associated with conventional relig-
ious divisions. Some readers may fear that, by making this move, we
have lost touch with the constitutional text. Are these fears well
grounded?
We think not. On the contrary, we believe that our approach is
handsomely consistent with the First Amendment's text. After all, the
Amendment does not say that "religion shall be vigorously exercised
in the United States." It says instead that "Congress shall make no law
... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] .185 Under this rule, the
people (all of them, not just those who are religious) are protected
from certain kinds of laws that, if enacted, would place inappropriate
burdens on the exercise of religion. What kinds of laws are these?
Nobody thinks that the Clause prohibits government from placing any
burdens on any form of religious practice. For example, the govern-
ment can prohibit human sacrifice and other harmful rituals, regard-
less of whether individuals have genuine religious motivations for
participating in them. The Free Exercise Clause instead prohibits the
government only from imposing certain kinds of burdens, and any
interpretation of the Clause must say which burdens these are. The
interpretation we propose replies, burdens of a kind that are histori-
cally associated with religious persecution.
Likewise, the Constitution does not say that religion should exist
separate from, or unaided, by the government. The Constitution does
not even say that the government shall not establish any religion.
Instead, it says, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion." 86 To the extent that scholars focus at all on the
word "respecting," they treat it as a kind of embarrassment for mod-
ern religious liberty jurisprudence: they suggest that it signifies ambiv-
alence about "disestablishment" by prohibiting Congress from making
84 Id. at 214-15.
85 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
86 Id.
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laws either for or against establishment.8 7 Our proposed interpreta-
tion makes a virtue of the word "respecting." It suggests that the word
broadens, rather than narrows, the impact of the Amendment's dises-
tablishment norm. A government action may violate the norm against
laws respecting an establishment of religion if it manifests the favorit-
ism characteristic of establishments, even if the law is one that merely
respects, rather than constitutes, an establishment of religion.
Finally, it is worth noting that our approach to the Religion
Clauses has much in common with familiar features of free speech
doctrine. The fact that a law targets speech or writing ("the press") is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for finding a violation of
the First Amendment's Speech and Press Clauses. Like the Religion
Clauses, those Clauses target a particular form of government miscon-
duct, namely, censorship, especially (though not exclusively) view-
point discrimination. That is why many people would consider laws
against flag-burning as paradigmatic First Amendment violations even
though they involve neither speech nor press, and why few people
regard reasonable copyright regulations as First Amendment viola-
tions even though they manifestly and significantly limit what people
can say and print.88
The purpose of these observations is not to suggest that our inter-
pretation "wins" on textual grounds. Few if any interesting constitu-
tional disputes can be settled on the basis of textual arguments;
indeed, the most important textual feature of the Constitution is that
it is open, by design rather than by accident, to principled disputes
about the meaning of religious freedom and other moral ideals. Our
objective is instead to undermine the common, understandable, but
ultimately mistaken idea that simply because the Religion Clauses
invoke the concept of religion, their scope must pivot upon the fine
points of theories about how to define religion.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Our goal in this Essay has been (despite its shamelessly provoca-
tive title!) a relatively modest one. We want to cast doubt on the com-
mon assumption which holds that to interpret the Constitution's
87 See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Antidisestablishmentarianism: Why RFRA Really Was
Unconstitutional, 95 MICH. L. Riv. 2347, 2350 (1997) (arguing that the word "respect-
ing" signifies that Congress is prohibited from dictating to states how to legislate on
religion).
88 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Censorship, Copyright, and Free Speech: Some Tenta-
tive Skepticism About the Campaign to Impose First Amendment Restrictions on Copyright Laws,
2J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 17, 22 (2003).
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Religion Clauses one must define what religion is, and that it is there-
fore something of an embarrassment that this fundamental question
has gone unanswered in American constitutional jurisprudence. We
have tried here only to establish the existence of a morally attractive,
textually plausible reading of the Constitution which not only does
not require us to define "religion" but which treats the refusal to do so
as a crucial virtue. We have not tried to justify that reading as the best
interpretation of the Constitution but only to exhibit it as a possible
approach. A much more extensive argument is required to defend
the interpretation; we have attempted to supply that argument in our
book Religious Freedom and the Constitution.89
Our approach has the significant advantage of clarifying cases,
such as those of the hypothetical Ms. Campbell and the quite real
Daniel Seeger, which become needlessly difficult and potentially
destructive of the core of religious liberty under theories that demand
a sharp distinction between the constitutional treatment of religion
and nonreligion. That does not mean that no hard cases will arise at
the boundary between religion and nonreligion. Our view, like the
constitutional text itself, focuses on forms of misconduct and discrimi-
nation related to historically familiar forms of religious conflict, and so it will
sometimes compel judges to ask difficult questions about whether an
alleged instance of misconduct bears the right relation to the key fea-
tures of religious conflict. These questions may arise, for example,
when secular claimants seek to share in accommodations extended to
religious believers. In our book, we devote several pages to examples
of this kind.90 The fact that these cases are genuinely hard should not
disturb anyone: the point of good theories, after all, is not to elimi-
nate hard cases, but rather to make sure we ask the right questions
about them.
We will close with a final comment on the question that opened
this Essay: does it matter what religion is? As we said in our introduc-
tion, yes, obviously it does, and profoundly so for many religious and
nonreligious people alike. It may not matter very much, though, if at
all, to constitutional jurisprudence. At times, we fear that the "yes"
answer to the ethical question deters people from fully acknowledging
the possibility of a "no" answer to the constitutional question. People
want constitutional jurisprudence to affirm the value of their religious
practices or of their conception of public life and the symbols that
attach to it. But the point of the Religion Clauses is not to affirm (or
deny) the value of religious practices, any more than the point of the
89 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 2.
90 Id. at 112-18
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Free Speech Clause is to affirm (or deny) the value of flag burning.
The point of the Religion Clauses is instead to prohibit the govern-
ment from showing the kinds of favoritism historically associated with
religious persecution, and any doctrine that would involve courts in
affirming (or denying) the value of religious practice would compro-
mise rather than advance that purpose.
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